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Essential elements of a 




Dan E. Krane, Wright State University, Dayton, OH
The science of DNA profiling is 
sound.
But, not all of DNA profiling is 
science.
Three generations of DNA testing
DQ-alpha
TEST STRIP







DNA content of biological samples:
Type of sample Amount of DNA
Blood 30,000 ng/mL
stain 1 cm   in area 200 ng
stain 1 mm   in area 2 ng
Semen 250,000 ng/mL




1 - 750 ng/hair








The ABI 310 Genetic Analyzer
ABI 310 Genetic Analyzer:
Capillary Electrophoresis




•DNA separated out by 
size:
– Large STRs travel 
slower
– Small STRs travel 
faster
•DNA pulled towards 
the positive electrode
•Color of STR detected 




Profiler Plus: Raw data
Statistical estimates: the product rule
0.222 x 0.222 x 2
= 0.1
Statistical estimates: the product rule
= 0.1
1 in 79,531,528,960,000,000
1 in 80 quadrillion
1 in 10 1 in 111 1 in 20
1 in 22,200
x x
1 in 100 1 in 14 1 in 81
1 in 113,400
x x
1 in 116 1 in 17 1 in 16
1 in 31,552
x x
What more is there to say after you 
have said: “The chance of a 
coincidental match is one in 80 
quadrillion?”
What more is there to say after you 
have said: “The chance of a 
coincidental match is one in 80 
quadrillion?”
• Two samples really do have the same 
source
• Samples match coincidentally
• An error has occurred
The science of DNA profiling is 
sound.
But, not all of DNA profiling is 
science.
Opportunities for subjective 
interpretation?
Can “Tom” be excluded?
Suspect D3 vWA FGA
Tom 17, 17 15, 17 25, 25
Opportunities for subjective 
interpretation?
Can “Tom” be excluded?
Suspect D3 vWA FGA
Tom 17, 17 15, 17 25, 25
No -- the additional alleles at D3 and FGA 
are “technical artifacts.”
Opportunities for subjective 
interpretation?
Can “Dick” be excluded?
Suspect D3 vWA FGA
Tom 17, 17 15, 17 25, 25
Dick 12, 17 15, 17 20, 25
Opportunities for subjective 
interpretation?
Can “Dick” be excluded?
Suspect D3 vWA FGA
Tom 17, 17 15, 17 25, 25
Dick 12, 17 15, 17 20, 25
No -- stochastic effects explain peak height 
disparity in D3; blob in FGA masks 20 allele.
Opportunities for subjective 
interpretation?
Can “Harry” be excluded?
Suspect D3 vWA FGA
Tom 17, 17 15, 17 25, 25
Dick 12, 17 15, 17 20, 25
Harry 14, 17 15, 17 20, 25
No -- the 14 allele at D3 may be missing due to 
“allelic drop out”; FGA blob masks the 20 allele.
Opportunities for subjective 
interpretation?
Can “Sally” be excluded?
Suspect D3 vWA FGA
Tom 17, 17 15, 17 25, 25
Dick 12, 17 15, 17 20, 25
Harry 14, 17 15, 17 20, 25
Sally 12, 17 15, 15 20, 22
No -- there must be a second contributor; 
degradation explains the “missing” FGA allele.
What can be done to make DNA 
testing more objective?
• Distinguish between signal and noise
• Deducing the number of contributors to 
mixtures
• Accounting for relatives
• Be mindful of the potential for human 
error
Where do peak height thresholds 
come from (originally)?
• Applied Biosystems validation study of 1998
• Wallin et al., 1998, “TWGDAM validation of the 
AmpFISTR blue PCR Amplification kit for forensic 
casework analysis.” JFS 43:854-870.
Where do peak height thresholds 
come from (originally)?
Where do peak height thresholds 
come from?
• “Conservative” thresholds established during 
validation studies
• Eliminate noise (even at the cost of eliminating 
signal)
• Can arbitrarily remove legitimate signal
• Contributions to noise vary over time (e.g. 
polymer and capillary age/condition)






























Many opportunities to measure baseline
Measurement of baseline in 
control samples:
• Negative controls: 5,932 data collection points 
(DCPs) per run (σ = 131 DCPs)
• Reagent blanks: 5,946 DCPs per run (σ = 87 DCPs)
• Positive controls: 2,415 DCP per run (σ = 198 DCPs)
Measurement of baseline in 
control samples:
• Negative controls: 5,932 data collection points (DCPs) 
per run (σ = 131 DCPs)
• Reagent blanks: 5,946 DCPs per run (σ = 87 DCPs)
• Positive controls: 2,415 DCP per run (σ = 198 DCPs)
• DCP regions corresponding to size standards and 
9947A peaks (plus and minus 55 DCPs to account for 
stutter in positive controls) were masked in all colors














Variation in baseline noise levels
Positive Control  µb σb µb + 3σb µb + 10σb 
 Maximum  6.7 6.9 27.4 75.7 
 Average  5.0 3.7 16.1 42.0 
 Minimum 3.7 2.4 10.9 27.7 
      
Negative Control  µb σb µb + 3σb µb + 10σb 
 Maximum  13.4 13.2 53.0 145.4 
 Average  5.4 3.9 17.1 44.4 
 Minimum 4.0 2.6 11.8 30.0 
      
Reagent Blank  µb σb µb + 3σb µb + 10σb 
 Maximum  6.5 11.0 39.5 116.5 
 Average  5.3 4.0 17.3 45.3 
 Minimum 4.0 2.6 11.8 30.0 
All three controls 
averaged  µb σb µb + 3σb µb + 10σb 
 Maximum 7.1 7.3 29.0 80.1 
 Average 5.2 3.9 16.9 44.2 
 Minimum 3.9 2.5 11.4 28.9 
 
Average ( b) and standard deviation (⌠b) values with corresponding 
LODs and LOQs from positive, negative and reagent blank controls in 
50 different runs.  BatchExtract: ftp://ftp.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pub/forensics/
Doesn’t someone either match or not?
Lines in the sand: a two-person mix?
Two reference samples in a 1:10 ratio (male:female).  Three different 
thresholds are shown: 150 RFU (red); LOQ at 77 RFU (blue); and LOD 
at 29 RFU (green).
Not all signal comes from DNA 
associated with an evidence sample
• Stutter peaks
• Pull-up (bleed through)
• Spikes and blobs
Stutter peaks
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Primary peak height vs. n+4 stutter peak height.  Evaluation of 37 data points, 
R2=0.293, p=0.0005.  From 224 reference samples in 52 different cases.  A filter 
of 5.9% would be conservative.  Rowland and Krane, accepted with revision 
by JFS.
Pull-up (and software differences)
Advanced Classic
Spikes
• 89 samples (references, pos controls, neg controls)
• 1010 “good” peaks
• 55 peaks associated with 24 spike events
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What can be done to make DNA 
testing more objective?
• Distinguish between signal and noise
• Deducing the number of contributors to 
mixtures
• Accounting for relatives





Suitable profiles for empirical mixing
•  959 complete 13-locus (CODIS-loci) STR genotypes used 
by the FBI for the purpose of allele frequency databases
•  Includes: Bahamians (153); Trinidadians (76); US African 
Americans (177); Southwest Hispanics (202); Jamaicans 
(157); and US Caucasians (194)
•  Available on-line at: 
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/fsc/backissu/july1999/dnaloci
•  Analyzed for Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium but no mention 
of possibility of relatives
How many contributors to a mixture if 
analysts can discard a locus?
?
Maximum # of 
alleles observed in 






There are 146,536,159 possible different 3-person mixtures of the 959 









How many contributors to a mixture if 
analysts can discard a locus?
?
Maximum # of 
alleles observed in 






There are 45,139,896 possible different 3-person mixtures of the 648 









How many contributors to a mixture?
Maximum # of 
alleles observed in 






There are 57,211,376 possible different 4-way mixtures of the 194 
individuals in the FB I Caucasian database (Paoletti et al., November 2005 
JFS).  (35,022,142,001 4-person mixtures with 959 individuals.)
Does testing more loci help?




Five simulations are shown with each data point representing 57,211,376 4-
person mixtures (average shown in black).  (Paoletti et al., November 2005 
JFS).  Mischaracterization rate of 76.34% for original 13 loci.
What contributes to overlapping 
alleles between individuals?
• Identity by state
-- many loci have a small number of detectable 
alleles (only 6 for TPOX and 7 for D13, D5, D3 and 
TH01)
-- some alleles at some loci are relatively common
• Identity by descent
-- relatives are more likely to share alleles than 
unrelated individuals
-- perfect 13 locus matches between siblings occur 
at an average rate of 3.0 per 459,361 sibling pairs
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Allele sharing in databases
•  Original FBI dataset’s mischaracterization 
rate for 3-person mixtures (3.39%) is more 
than two σ above the average observed in 
five sets of randomized individuals
•  Original FBI dataset has more shared allele 
counts above 19 than five sets of 
randomized individuals (3 vs. an average of 
1.4)
Final thoughts on mixed samples
• Maximum allele count by itself is not a reliable predictor 
of the number of contributors to mixed forensic DNA 
samples.
• Simply reporting that a sample “arises from two or more 
individuals” is reasonable and appropriate.
• Analysts should exercise great caution when invoking 
discretion.
• Excess allele sharing observed in the FBI allele frequency 
database is most easily explained by the presence of 
relatives in that database.
Familial searching
• Database search yields a close but imperfect 
DNA match
• Can suggest a relative is the true perpetrator
• Great Britain performs them routinely
• Reluctance to perform them in US since 1992 
NRC report
• Current CODIS software cannot perform 
effective searches
Three approaches to familial 
searches
• Search for rare alleles (inefficient)
• Count matching alleles (arbitrary)
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Is the true DNA match a relative or a 
random individual?
• Given a closely matching profile, who is 
more likely to match, a relative or a 
randomly chosen, unrelated individual?






Is the true DNA match a relative or a 
random individual?
• What is the likelihood that a relative of a 
single initial suspect would match the evidence 
sample perfectly?
• What is the likelihood that a single randomly 







Probabilities of siblings matching at 
0, 1 or 2 alleles
HF = 1 for homozygous loci and 2 for heterozygous loci; 
Pa is the frequency of the allele shared by the evidence 































Probabilities of parent/child 
matching at 0, 1 or 2 alleles
HF = 1 for homozygous loci and 2 for heterozygous loci; 
Pa is the frequency of the allele shared by the evidence 






























































































HF = 1 for homozygous loci and 2 for heterozygous loci; 
Pa is the frequency of the allele shared by the evidence 
sample and the individual in a database.
Familial search experiment
• Randomly pick related pair or unrelated pair 
from a synthetic database
• Choose one profile to be evidence and one 
profile to be initial suspect
• Test hypothesis:
– H0: A relative is the source of the evidence
– HA: An unrelated person is the source of the      
evidence
Paoletti, D., Doom, T., Raymer, M. and Krane, D.  2006.  Assessing 
the implications for close relatives in the event of similar but non-
matching DNA profiles.  Jurimetrics, 46:161-175.
Hypothesis testing using an LR 

























Two types of errors
• False positives (Type I): an initial suspect’s 
family is investigated even though an 
unrelated individual is the actual source of the 
evidence sample.
• False negatives (Type II): an initial suspect’s 
family is not be investigated even though a 
relative really is the source of the evidence 
sample.
• A wide net (low LR threshold) catches more 
criminals but comes at the cost of more 
fruitless investigations.
Type I and II errors with prior 









0.0001 0.001 0.01 0.1 1 10 100 1000 10000
Sibling false positive
Sibling false negative 
Type I and II errors with prior odds of 
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AA sibling false positive
AA sibling false negative 
Sibling false positive
Sibling false negative
Is the true DNA match a relative or a 
random individual?
• What is the likelihood that a close relative of a 
single initial suspect would match the evidence 
sample perfectly?
• What is the likelihood that a single randomly 




P E | relative( )
P(E | random)
Is the true DNA match a relative or a 
random individual?
• What is the likelihood that the source of the 
evidence sample was a relative of an initial 
suspect?
Prior odds:













Is the true DNA match a relative or a 
random individual?
• This more difficult question is ultimately 
governed by two considerations:
– What is the size of the alternative suspect 
pool?
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How well does an LR approach 
perform relative to alternatives?
• Low-stringency CODIS search identifies all 
10,000 parent-child pairs (but only 1,183 sibling pairs 
and less than 3% of all other relationships and a high false 
positive rate)
• Moderate and high-stringency CODIS searches 
failed to identify any pairs for any relationship
• An allele count-threshold (set at 20 out of 30 
alleles) identifies 4,233 siblings and 1,882 
parent-child pairs (but fewer than 70 of any other 
relationship and with no false positives)
How well does an LR approach 
perform relative to alternatives?
• LR set at 1 identifies > 99% of both sibling and 
parent-child pairs (with false positive rates of 0.01% 
and 0.1%, respectively)
• LR set at 10,000 identifies 64% of siblings and 
56% of parent-child pairs (with no false positives)
• Use of non-cognate allele frequencies results in 
an increase in false positives and a decrease in 
true positives (that are largely offset by either a ceiling 
or consensus approach)
How well does an LR approach 
perform relative to alternatives?
• LR set at 1 identifies > 78% of half-sibling, aunt-
niece, and grandparent-grandchild pairs (with false 
positive rates at or below 9%)
• LR set at 1 identifies 58% of cousin pairs (with a 
19% false positive rate)
• LR set at 10,000 identifies virtually no half-
sibling, aunt-niece, grandparent-grandchild or 
cousin pairs (with no false positives)
How well does an LR approach 
perform with mixed samples?
• LR set at 1 identifies >99% of both sibling and 
parent-child pairs even in 2- and 3-person 
mixtures (with false positive rates of 10% and 15%, and 
of 0.01% and 0.07%, respectively)
• LR set at 1 identifies >86% of half-sibling, aunt-
niece, and grandparent-grandchild pairs in 2-
and 3-person mixtures (with false positive rates lower 
than 22% and 30%, respectively)
• LR set at 1 identifies >74% of cousin pairs in 2-
and 3-person mixtures (with false positive rates of 
41% and 49%, respectively)
What can be done to make DNA 
testing more objective?
• Distinguish between signal and noise
• Deducing the number of contributors to 
mixtures
• Accounting for relatives
• Be mindful of the potential for human 
error
Victorian Coroner’s inquest into the 
death of Jaidyn Leskie
• Toddler disappears in bizarre 
circumstances: found dead 
six months later
• Mother’s boy friend is tried 
and acquitted.
• Unknown female profile on 
clothing.
• Cold hit to a rape victim.
• RMP: 1 in 227 million.
• Lab claims “adventitious 
match.”
Victorian Coroner’s inquest into the 
death of Jaidyn Leskie
• Condom with rape victim’s 
DNA was processed in the 
same lab 1 or 2 days prior to 
Leskie samples.
• Additional tests find matches 
at 5 to 7 more loci.
• Review of electronic data 
reveals low level 
contributions at even more 
loci.
• Degradation study further 
suggests contamination.
Degradation, inhibition
• When biological samples are exposed to adverse 
environmental conditions, they can become degraded
– Warm, moist, sunlight, time
• Degradation breaks the DNA at random
• Larger amplified regions are affected first
• Classic ‘ski-slope’ electropherogram












The Leskie Inquest, a practical application
• Undegraded samples can 
have “ski-slopes” too.
• How negative does a 
slope have to be to an 
indication of degradation?
• Experience, training and 
expertise.




• DNA profiles in a rape 
and a murder 
investigation match.
• Everyone agrees that the 
murder samples are 
degraded.
• If the rape sample is 
degraded, it could have 
contaminated the murder 
samples.




Victorian Coroner’s inquest into the 
death of Jaidyn Leskie
“8. During the conduct of the 
preliminary investigation 
(before it was decided to 
undertake an inquest) the 
female DNA allegedly taken 
from the bib that was 
discovered with the body 
was matched with a DNA 
profile in the Victorian 
Police Forensic Science 
database.  This profile was 
from a rape victim who was 
subsequently found to be 
unrelated to the Leskie 
case.”
Victorian Coroner’s inquest into the 
death of Jaidyn Leskie
“8. The match to the bib 
occurred as a result of 
contamination in the 
laboratory and was not an 
adventitious match.  The 
samples from the two 
cases were examined by 




The science of DNA profiling is 
sound.
But, not all of DNA profiling is 
science.
This is especially true in situations 
involving: small amounts of starting 




– Forensic Bioinformatics Website: http://www.bioforensics.com/
– Applied Biosystems Website: http://www.appliedbiosystems.com/
(see human identity and forensics)
– STR base: http://www.cstl.nist.gov/biotech/strbase/ (very useful)
• Books
– ‘Forensic DNA Typing’ by John M. Butler (Academic Press)
• Scientists
– Larry Mueller (UC Irvine)
– Simon Ford (Lexigen, Inc. San Francisco, CA)
– William Shields (SUNY, Syracuse, NY)
– Mike Raymer and Travis Doom (Wright State, Dayton, OH)
– Marc Taylor (Technical Associates, Ventura, CA)
– Keith Inman (Forensic Analytical, Haywood, CA)
• Testing laboratories
– Technical Associates (Ventura, CA)
– Forensic Analytical (Haywood, CA)
• Other resources
– Forensic Bioinformatics (Dayton, OH)
